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Abstract 
 
We compare the structure and performance of for-profit (FP), nonprofit (NP) and local government (LG) organizations. 
These organizations differ in their ownership structure, objectives and agency relations. We conjecture that, compared to 
NP and LG, FP firms (a) delegate less decision-making power to employees, (b) provide more incentives and fewer fringe 
benefits, (c) monitor less, and (d) rely less on social networks to recruit employees. We also hypothesize that, relative to 
NP and LG, FP firms (i) are more efficient, (ii) provide similar levels of service elements that observable to their 
customers, (iii) provide lower levels of less-well observable elements, and (iv) provide less of the relational elements. 
Differences in structure and performance are likely to be tempered by regulation, market competition and institutional 
pressures for similarity. We study detailed performance outcomes for all the 369 Minnesota nursing homes included in 
federal and state datasets, and organization structure for a subsample of 105 homes that responded to our survey. Our 
empirical investigation generally supports our hypotheses. In particular, we find that FP homes serve more residents than 
NP and LG, after controlling for quality differences. However, FP homes provide lower quality services on a large array 
of attributes, especially those that are less observable by nursing home residents and their families. The differences among 
different types of organization are small, but significant. 
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Does Organization Ownership Matter?  
Structure and Performance in For-profit, Nonprofit and Local Government Nursing Homes 
 
I. Introduction 
Does it make a difference whether children go to a for-profit, nonprofit or government child care center, 
elementary school or college? Would you prefer to place an elderly relative – or end up yourself – in a for-profit, 
nonprofit or local government nursing home? Are there significant differences among for-profit, nonprofit and 
government organizations in the way in which they are structured, what they produce, and how they produce it? 
Does organization ownership matter? 
Differences in ownership may affect organizational objectives, organizational efficiency, and other 
factors, and the size of their impact depends on the nature of the products, market competition and more. A key 
difference among for-profit, nonprofit and local government organizations concerns the identity of those who 
possess ultimate control over them: owners, boards of trustees, and politicians, respectively. The locus of 
control affects organizational objectives, with owners of for-profit firms designating pursuit of profits as their 
organizations’ objective. Trustees and directors of nonprofit organizations are expected to advance some 
product-related goals such as quality or access. Those in charge of government organizations may seek also 
product-related goals, perhaps additional social goals (such as those related to provision of employment to 
certain groups) or, usually illicitly, advancement of their political aspirations.  
The wealth of owners is tied to the success of the for-profit firms in which they have ownership stakes, 
whereas the individuals who control nonprofit and government organizations have no legal ownership stakes. 
Simple agency considerations suggest therefore that principals of for-profit firms will be more effective in 
driving efficiency than their counterparts in nonprofit and government organizations. However, nonprofit and 
government organizations may draw leaders, workers and managers who believe in providing products that 
reflect some public needs, and may be motivated to work effectively towards such goals beyond what is dictated 
by their narrow financial interests. Moreover, those who design the structure of such organizations may be 
aware of their specific advantages and disadvantages and may choose the design that is most conducive to the 
attainment of their goals. Organizations pursue their objectives not only through internal design but also by 
responding to opportunities such as market power, the nature of their product and asymmetric information. The 
extent and fashion in which an organization will exploit its power or informational advantage about the 
characteristics of a product at the expense of consumers depends on its objectives. Thus the way an organization 
is designed and how it performs on various dimensions is likely to depend on who owns and controls it through 
(a) the goals that are set for the organization, (b) the agency problems the organization faces, (c) who is 
attracted to work in the organization, and (d) the opportunities the organization enjoys for advancing its goals.  
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The empirical literature dealing with the issues raised above typically involves two-way comparisons, 
for-profit firms versus state-owned firms, and for-profit firms versus nonprofit organizations. Most studies 
address questions of performance; the few studies that consider organization structure look at isolated elements, 
mostly at wages and incentives. The literature that deals with differences in performance between state-owned 
enterprises and privately-owned firms, frequently in the context of transition economies, seeks to tease out the 
performance effects of different forms of privatization, varieties of private owners, diverse market structures, 
and institutional environments (e.g., Megginson and Netter, 2001 and Brown, Earle and Telegedy, 2006). 
Broadly, these studies find that replacing state ownership from large swaths of the economy has a favorable 
effect on labor productivity and related measures of economic performance, as one would expect from the 
agency-theoretic perspective that predicts that letting private owners run firms instead of state-appointed ‘red’ 
managers should generate some efficiency gains. 
The literature that compares for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations and government organizations 
focuses on services in developed market economies, the industries where these organizations coexist. Services 
have multiple dimensions and the outcomes of their delivery depend not only on the producer but also on the 
consumer. Whereas a good such as a car has attributes determined by the production process that can be 
measured independently of the characteristics of its purchasers, the outcomes of a service such as medical 
treatment depend not only on the skills of the medical team and the attributes of the hospital where the team 
practices but also on the characteristics of the patient during and after treatment. These features complicate the 
evaluation of performance and bring into the fore the potentially important role of the interplay among the four 
factors that may vary across different types of organization: goals, agency problems, worker self-selection, and 
the willingness to exploit opportunities. So it is not surprising that the literature on the comparative performance 
of for-profit, nonprofit and government in general and in the most studied industry, hospitals, reveals uneven 
patterns. The results of empirical research on performance (there is very little on organization structure) are 
contingent on numerous industry-specific details; moreover, it is hard to make sense of the disparate findings 
outside the context of a theoretical framework. We review one segment of this literature (on nursing homes) 
later in this section.1  
The present paper takes up the question in the title in the context of nursing homes and examines it 
empirically using a uniquely rich dataset from Minnesota. Nursing homes provide a complex and multi-
dimensional product, care for physically frail and cognitively impaired individuals. The nature of nursing home 
care gives rise to substantial asymmetric information between providers and residents, residents’ families, 
insurance companies, guardians and other parties with interest in the well-being of residents. This feature and 
 
1 There is a substantial body of management literature that compares structure and performance in private and public organizations. 
Although written from a different scholarly perspective with somewhat different concerns, the findings are generally similar to those 
in the economics literature; see Boyne (2002). 
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the fact that the majority of people end up spending time in a nursing home have generated substantial scholarly 
and journalistic interest in the industry as well as regulatory oversight.2 The industry is regulated and overseen 
by various government agencies, generating a wealth of data that are not available for other industries with the 
exception of hospitals. Unlike hospitals, nursing homes are small (the average home has fewer than 100 
residents) and relatively simple organizations that provide a single product, nursing care but not medical 
treatment, relying on a staff that includes a limited range of occupations. 3  The nursing home industry is 
populated by for-profit, nonprofit and local government (heretofore FP, NP and LG, respectively) organizations, 
making it eminently suitable for investigation of the differences in structure and performance among different 
types of organization.4  
Although nursing homes have distinct features that differentiate them from many other industries, our 
analysis is relevant for the understanding of differences among the three types of organization in general. We 
regard this investigation as a contribution to the understanding of differences among organizations that can be 
extracted only by a careful examination of industry-specific attributes, which must be studied carefully and in 
detail. For example, it would be nearly impossible to specify multiple variables that capture different degrees of 
asymmetric information between sellers and buyers in a believable and convincing manner across multiple 
industries in order to test predictions relevant to the concept of asymmetric information (not to mention the 
impracticality of collecting data to support such variables). Such specification is highly industry-specific and 
requires deeper investigation than that afforded in a cross-industry inquiry. 
 
The empirical literature on different types of organization in the nursing home industry  
The comparative literature on nursing homes, like that on other industries, has focused much on 
performance and little on organization structure. An excellent survey of the literature (through the end of 2002) 
is presented by Schlesinger and Gray (2006), who compare NP and FP nursing homes in terms of various 
dimensions of performance, including economic efficiency, quality of care, and accessibility for unprofitable 
patients. The authors summarize their findings in a table, which is reproduced below without the references. 
Their principal conclusions are that (1) FP nursing homes have an advantage over NP homes in terms of various 
 
2 In 1980, the book Unloving Care: The Nursing Home Tragedy by Bruce Vladeck uncovered a range of troublesome abuses. Since 
then, the regulatory framework was strengthened, partly in response to the book’s revelations, but later research and personal 
witnesses reveal that problems remain; see, for example, GAO (2007), a book by a nursing home aide (Gass, 2004) relating his own 
experience, and a book by a renowned scholar of long-term care and his sister recounting the nursing home experience of their mother 
(Kane and West, 2005).  
3 To ensure greater homogeneity of the type of service we study, we exclude from our sample the few nursing homes that provide 
specialty care (such as to mentally-ill patients). To ensure greater clarity in the types of organization examined here, we exclude the 
handful of nursing homes that are owned by state government (predominantly caring for military veterans in conjunction with the 
federal Veterans Affairs Administration), with the obvious cost of being unable to say anything about state-government owned nursing 
homes. 
4 The reasons for coexistence of the three types of organization in this industry are varied, but ultimately are likely to be linked to 
asymmetric information problems; see Hansmann (1996) for a theoretically-driven historical discussion.  
measures of economic efficiency, and (2) service quality is significantly higher in NPs (controlling for various 
home and resident characteristics).  
Schlesinger and Gray (2006) also review studies that focus specifically on dimensions of quality that are 
relatively easy to monitor or assess and dimensions that are relatively difficult to monitor because customers 
suffer from asymmetric information relative to producers, dimensions which Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) 
term Type I and Type II dimensions, respectively. They found that “the empirical research that directly 
measures quality is biased toward measuring Type I aspect, since they are by definition those that are more 
readily measured” (p. 389). To the consumers of nursing home services the more accessible measures involve 
regulatory violations, because the information has been publicly available through government regulatory 
bodies and since the early 2000s it has been disclosed online; two studies showed little difference between NP 
and FP homes. Other measures were favorable to NP homes. Compared to FP homes, NP homes were found to 
be associated with lower resident mortality and lower incidence of adverse outcomes such as infections, 
decubitus ulcers, dehydration, physical restraints and accidents rates; these are relatively observable, Type I, 
outcomes. Schlesinger and Gray (2006) focus on several direct and indirect indicators of Type II outcomes, 
including consumers’ choice between FP and NP homes (less-informed consumers should seek out nonprofit 
providers), home residents’ experience and reports of care problems, complaints and malpractice claims filed by 
residents, adoption of new care technologies, and more; NP homes have better outcomes in all these outcomes. 
 
Schlesinger and Gray’s 2006 Summary of Empirical Findings Comparing Performance of Nursing 
Homes of Different Types of Ownership* 
 
 Specific measures (number of studies using this measure) 
Direction of findings Economic performance Quality of care  Accessibility for unprofitable patients 
NP advantage Administrative overhead (1) 
Revenues per admission (4) 
Malpractice suits (1) 
Satisfaction with treatment (2) 
Process measures of quality (6) 
Regulatory violations (5) 
Adverse outcomes (8) 
Physical restraints (3) 
 
Services at reduced charge (1) 
No difference Administrative overhead (3) 
Measures of inefficiency (1) 
Regulatory violations (2) 
Functional improvements (3) 
Process measures (2) 
 
Medicaid admissions (1) 
FP advantage Average operating cost (7) 
Measures of inefficiency (7) 
Average total cost (5) 
Adverse outcomes (1) 
Antipsychotic use (1) 
Medicaid admissions (4) 
 *Adapted from Schlesinger and Grady (2006, p. 385), who provide complete references and detailed discussion. 
 
More recent studies, using new measures of performance or revisiting old ones, generate results that are 
consistent with the studies summarized by Schlesinger and Gray (2006). Knox, Blankmeyer and Stutzman 
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(2003) find that, controlling for quality differences, FP nursing homes in Texas are overwhelmingly more cost 
efficient than NP homes. In a national dataset, Stevenson (2006) finds that the incidence of consumer 
complaints in FP nursing homes is twice as high as that in NP homes. Ballou (2005) examines choices made by 
Wisconsin consumers who pay their own nursing home expenses and finds that they favor NP homes over FP 
and LG homes. Hirth, Banaszak-Holl, Fries and Turenne (2003) find that (1) that residents are more likely to 
transfer out of low quality than out of high quality homes, and that (2) FP residents are more likely than NP 
residents to transfer to other nursing homes. Grabowski and Castle (2004) find that a higher NP market share is 
associated with higher quality in both FP and NP homes. O’Neill, Harrington, Kitchener and Saliba (2003) find 
that a profit level above a certain threshold is associated with a significantly higher number of regulatory 
deficiencies in FP homes, but not in NP homes. A literature review by Hillmer, Wodchis, Gill, Anderson and 
Rochon (2005), focusing on ownership-related quality differences, like Schlesinger and Gray (2006), found 
systematic quality differences favoring NP homes. 
In sum, the literature provides a fairly consistent picture whereby FP nursing homes are run at a lower 
cost and possibly more efficiently than NP homes, but NP homes provide higher quality services than FP homes. 
The link between the two findings, to the extent that it is explained, is attributed to the tradeoff between 
financial and non-financial goals and the difference in goals between FP and LG homes. There is too little 
research comparing LG homes with the other two types to draw any conclusions. Finally, there is no evidence 
on comparative organization structure of nursing homes of different ownership types.  
Our study contributes to the comparative literature on nursing homes in several ways. First, we develop 
a theoretical framework that focuses on organizational goals, agency problems, worker self-selection, and an 
organization’s willingness to exploit opportunities to enhance its goals. We generate predictions about 
ownership-related differences in (a) organization structure in terms of delegation of decision-making, incentives, 
recruiting and monitoring, and (b) performance in terms of efficiency and provision of observable (Type I) and 
unobservable (Type II) dimensions of nursing home care. Second, we use a unique dataset to explore 
empirically these theoretical predictions about both structure and performance. Our variables concern multiple 
elements of organization structure, and multiple outcome variables reflect a broad spectrum of observability of 
quality dimensions as well as productive efficiency. We can therefore examine more closely organization 
structure and the relationship between efficiency and quality choices on the basis of variables reflecting the 
same organizations and the same decision-making processes than was possible in the extant literature. Finally, 
in addition to FP and NP homes, the focus of much of the extant literature, we study also LG homes. Thus this 
study presents both a comprehensive theoretical framework and a comprehensive test of predictions stemming 
from it. 
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We investigate performance of all nursing homes in Minnesota that appear in relevant state and federal 
datasets (369 homes), and organization structure among homes that responded to our survey (121 homes, of 
which 105 have usable detailed data). The single-industry and single-state focus confers the advantages of 
minimization of unobserved heterogeneity in industry characteristics, regulation, cultural practices, social norms, 
and more, and the assemblage of a uniquely-detailed dataset. In particular, the regulatory framework and 
enforcement, which vary widely across states and even within states, are uniform in the state of Minnesota. 
Furthermore, nursing homes in Minnesota are price-controlled (relative to residents’ need for care and 
geographic location), and access to nursing home care is assured regardless of the ability to pay. In addition to 
being actively regulated on many dimensions of quality to comply with federal regulations, the availability of 
data on Minnesota nursing homes is better than almost anywhere else thanks to the state’s recent initiative to 
augment the collection of data already mandated by the federal government with data on quality and resident 
satisfaction. Focusing an empirical analysis on structure and performance of different types of organization in 
this environment is likely to result in findings that are less influenced by unobserved heterogeneity and omitted 
variables and therefore allow better inference about the effects of organization type, than analyses based on 
other datasets on nursing homes or other industries. Because nursing homes are relatively small organizations, 
the information reflects the circumstances of homogeneous organizations, in contrast with the diverse 
circumstances of larger organizations where practices may differ considerably across sites and departments. 
Given the regulatory framework to which nursing homes are subjected, and strong professional 
standards that guide the work of nurses, one would expect few, if any, differences among the three types of 
organization. Nevertheless, our empirical findings suggest that there are statistically significant differences in 
structure and performance among the three types of organization in ways predicted by economic theory. The 
rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II of the paper we develop a conceptual framework for the 
analysis of the relationship between organization type, structure and performance. In Section III we introduce 
the nursing home industry, the datasets, and variables used in the empirical estimations. In Section IV we 
describe our empirical investigation. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. A Theoretical Framework for the Investigation of Organizational Type, Structure and Performance  
 This section focuses on a comparison of models or ‘ideal’ types of FP, NP, and LG organizations. We 
recognize of course the great diversity within each type associated with size, dispersion of principals, and much 
more. We control for some of these factors in the empirical work but do not discuss them in this section. 
Furthermore, for similar reasons of the need for focus and relative brevity we defer most discussion of 
differences between NP and LG organizations until the empirical section. 
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(a) Performance in different types of organization 
In a narrow sense, organizational performance reflects organizational (principals’) objectives, such as 
profitability. However, in order to compare the performance of organizations of different types a broader 
conceptualization is necessary. More broadly, organizational performance also includes the organization’s 
effects on social welfare through its impact on the well-being of various stakeholders that interact with it.  
Conceptually, organizational objectives can be deduced from the identity of the principals who control 
an organization. In the case of FP firms, the principals are equity owners; in general, they seek the best returns 
on their investments, suggesting the goal of profit maximization. In NP organizations, the principals may be 
individuals or organizations who feel that FP provision is unsatisfactory and prefer to run an organization that 
pursues the goal of consumer well-being. The principals may be consumers or others who care about them, such 
as cultural associations, religious groups and foundations.5  In some jurisdictions, particularly in smaller and 
relatively homogeneous locales, government may undertake provision on behalf of some groups of current and 
potential consumers and possibly broader goals compatible with government actions.6  
Will different types of organization pursue their respective goals with equal effectiveness? The diffuse 
or nonexistent ownership rights in NP organizations and to a greater extent in LG organizations (although to a 
lesser degree than in higher-level government) has long been a source of suspected lower efficiency as 
compared to FP firms. The argument has been formulated in diverse ways but it essentially states that without 
financially-motivated owners, NP and LG organizations will suffer from the problem that ultimately less effort 
than in FP firms will be exercised in “monitoring the monitors,” enforcing good management and making sure 
that employees at all levels of the organization perform optimally.7  
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) also noted the problem in their analysis of agency problems, but 
concluded that appropriate organization design can handle the problems. In particular, boards of directors 
should be able to exercise sufficient control to eliminate the efficiency differences between NP and FP 
organizations (we discuss organization design in more detail below). Of course, the problem of efficiency 
associated with insufficient motivation by principals who have no ownership claims can be compensated by 
 
5 For example, in Rochdale, England local stores were suspected of selling adulterated foodstuff (milk diluted with water, flour mixed 
with aluminum to whiten it or potatoes mixed with limestone to bulk it up), exploiting the fact that it was not easily discernable from 
unadulterated foodstuff; this being in the first half of the nineteenth century, government was not effective at regulating provision of 
foodstuff and at reducing asymmetric information between sellers and buyers. After a few unsuccessful attempts (due to insufficient 
capital, free ridership and other organizational problems), the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was founded by local residents 
in 1844 essentially as a NP organization aimed at providing unadulterated foodstuff at the lowest possible prices. The Rochdale 
Society’s principles have become the principles underlying the operation of consumer cooperatives worldwide (Enke, 1945). 
6 Some groups may seek to correct problems with access to public goods associated with the possibility of excludability, by providing 
a service such as library or a park at a low or no cost; religious groups may emphasize the provision of local public goods to their co-
religionists by supplying a suitable religious environment; and LG organizations will, often by law, provide services with universal 
access and will have additional objectives associated with different citizen and lobby groups.  
7 For example, Clarkson (1972) made this sort of argument in the context of hospitals, using the perspective of the ‘property rights’ 
school. 
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other type of motivation, particularly that which stems from support for the organization’s goals. Principals 
(members of board of directors in particular) who are motivated by their belief in the mission of their 
organization may possibly act as effectively as profit-motivated owners. Furthermore, managers and employees 
in NP and LG may share the values or goals of the NP and LG in which they work, thus avoiding the problem 
of compliance with organizational goals in the first place.8  
A further and significant complication arises from the fact that the objectives of NP and LG 
organizations are more complex and more difficult to formulate and to articulate than the single and 
quantitatively simple measure of profit. This makes it more difficult to hold managers and employees 
responsible for performance that cannot be clearly contrasted with objectives. This perspective suggests that NP 
and LG organizations are likely to be less-well managed than FP firms. 
In sum, NP and LG face more severe agency problems than FP, starting with managers who may invest 
less effort in planning, the design of strategy, ensuring that workers do their best to advance organizational 
objectives, and other managerial duties. Whether corrective organization design and improved motivation 
associated with support for organizational goals by board members, managers and employees are sufficient to 
raise the efficiency of NP and LG organizations to that of FP firms, or even exceed it, is an empirical question. 
An organization’s output may be characterized in terms of quantity (such as the number of residents 
served by a nursing home) and quality (attributes such durability, reliability, and effectiveness in accomplishing 
its stated purposes). Some of the quality attributes are subject to asymmetric information between seller and 
buyer and, as the large literature has shown, present special opportunities for the pursuit of sellers’ profits, and 
potentially other objectives (see Akerlof, 1970, for the classic discussion of this issue). Asymmetric information 
is an important factor in situations where the quality attributes are not immediately apparent, and where the 
materialization of these attributes depends partly on consumer behavior and characteristics, e.g., the health of 
residents in nursing homes and child development outcomes in day care centers. Asymmetric information is 
especially prominent in situations where some consumption decisions are made by persons other than the direct 
consumers, such as parents of children in day care and family members and insurers in the case of many nursing 
home residents. Quality attributes may thus be classified relative to the degree of asymmetric information 
between sellers and consumers, ranging from observable to unobservable attributes (Type I and Type II 
attributes in Weisbrod and Schlesinger’s, 1986, classification). For example, the relatively observable attributes 
in a nursing home concern the size of residents’ rooms, the quality of food, the appearance of facilities and the 
ratio of nursing staff to residents, which can be evaluated by a relative visiting on a weekend. In contrast, 
partially-incapacitated residents have limited ability to judge the details of the services they receive separately 
from the effects of their own condition and may be unable to communicate their needs and their perception of 
 
8 See Preston (1989), Leete (2006) and Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) for NP and Boyne (2002) for government. 
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the quality of services they receive to members of their family; these details are not discernible by a visiting 
relative. 
Competition should drive organizations of different type to provide similar levels of the observable 
attributes, with consumers gravitating to higher-quality providers. However, competition does not work for 
unobservable attributes. One may imagine that unobservable attributes may, over long periods of time, become 
partially known through accumulated and combined observations of many consumers and family members, 
which may be stored in an organization’s reputation in the community. The effectiveness of this mechanism is 
limited by the fact that most people have only one nursing home experience, each experience is unique, and 
most experiences are, by the very circumstances of how people end up in nursing homes, preordained to have an 
undesirable ending. With this sort of data it is hard to make sense of small differences across organizations. 
Information made available by regulators and other parties may further reduce the long-term asymmetric 
information between sellers and consumers.  
Providers of a service may be able to provide little of the unobservable elements even if they are desired 
by consumers because they cannot observe actual delivery.9 FP firms have a financial motive to undersupply 
these elements because their production is costly. NP and LG organizations’ commonly stated objectives can 
rarely induce them to seek to take advantage of consumers’ informational disadvantage (some seek to remedy 
market failure associated with asymmetric information). Indeed, a central theory of NP organizations considers 
their emergence as a response to the market failure caused by asymmetric information by providing trustworthy 
services to customers (Arrow, 1963; Hansmann, 1980; Hirth, 1999).  
However, if NP and LG organizations’ objective is to provide their product to the largest possible 
number of consumers who may otherwise not have access to the product, then they may undersupply 
unobservable attributes in order to shift resources to provide a larger quantity.10 Undersupply may also arise if, 
in the shadow of severe agency problems, employees may shirk their responsibilities in areas in which negative 
effects are hard to observe, or managers may divert resources to show visible results that are valued by donors 
or higher levels of LG.11 Although the possibility of undersupply of unobservable attributes by NP and LG 
organizations exists and therefore the difference between them and FP firms cannot be theoretically signed, we 
expect that bona fide NP and LG organizations will provide higher levels of unobservable attributes, especially 
if self-selection by employees eliminates gross undersupply of such attributes by shirking employees. 
 
9 How little they can provide depends on how the unobservable elements are co-produced with observable elements, whether the 
degree of unobservability varies across consumers, and, of course, the willingness of employees to cooperate in the undersupply of 
these elements. 
10 This objective does not fit the nursing home industry, particularly in Minnesota, because poor individuals’ care is largely covered by 
the government. 
11 The asymmetric information problem that affects adversely consumers may be present in the principal-agent relationship, too, 
allowing managers and workers to do things that principals would not approve of; however, this is not an element that differentiates 
across types of organization. 
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Personal services and health care contain a relational or affective attribute associated with the human 
interaction between providers and consumers, and among consumers. The quality of the relationship between 
providers and their charges depends on the concern and empathy exhibited by providers. In NP, these are likely 
to be organizational goals that affect hiring of employees and their task assignments, more than in FP firms (Gui, 
2005). This attribute is unobservable by those who are not direct consumers because it has no physical 
correlates and when direct consumers (such as many nursing home residents) are not able to articulate their 
emotional experiences. The relational attribute is likely to be provided better by NP and LG organizations that 
are concerned with consumers’ well-being than by FP firms that may divert resources from it to observable 
attributes.  
In sum, we hypothesize that, as compared to FP firms, NP and especially LG organizations will exhibit 
lower productive efficiency, and will provide a higher level of relational elements as well as higher quality, 
especially for less observable attributes. 
 
(b) Organization type and organization structure  
Organizations adopt various measures to direct employees’ efforts towards organizational objectives. 
These measures are captured by organization structure (design), including the allocation of decision-making, 
pay and incentives, monitoring, evaluation, selection of new workers, and more. There are many factors that 
affect the choice of organization structure (Ben-Ner, Montias and Neuberger, 1993); here we are concerned 
with differences associated with the type of organization, keeping constant the nature of the product. These 
differences depend on the relative costs and benefits of deploying the various practices in the three types of 
organization. 
The key choice concerns the allocation of decision-making, with other elements of organization 
structure supporting the effectiveness of a particular allocation (Prendergast, 2002; Ben-Ner, Kong and Lluis, 
2007). NP and LG organizations are more likely than FP firms to delegate decisions to workers for three 
reasons. First, delegation, especially to key workers, may be a consequence of the decision-making vacuum 
created by less involved principals due to the agency problems discussed earlier (Pauly and Redisch, 1973; 
Glaeser, 2003). Second, NP and LG workers will be granted greater autonomy as to how, when to deliver 
relations elements (the delivery of tender, loving care cannot be directed from above). Third, if there is indeed 
self selection by workers attracted by NP and LG objectives, they will be trusted more than their FP 
counterparts and therefore they will be permitted a greater degree of decision-making autonomy.  
Delegated decision-making authority must be supported by appropriate motivation to ensure that it is 
exercised in support of the organization’s objectives. Some of the motivation may come from employees’ 
intrinsic motivation to do the right job in their occupations and their organizations. It has been argued that NP 
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and LG workers’ values are better aligned with those of the organizations in which they work than is the case 
for FP workers (Francois, 2000; DeVaro and Brookshire, 2007). If this is indeed so, NP and LG organizations 
will have to invest less in practices that support appropriate decisions than FP firms, but it is extremely unlikely 
to eliminate the agency problem or even compensate for the agency problems associated with the lack of 
ownership rights in NP and LG organizations. Ultimately, the question of the net effects of value congruence 
and ownership rights on organization structure is an empirical question.  
Appropriate motivation may also be generated through incentives that tie rewards to actions. In FP firms, 
executives, managers and lower-level employees can be compensated relative to firm objectives through various 
incentives linked to profits. Top executives may share in profits or own stock, and in turn they may proffer 
lower-level employees incentives that promote profit-enhancing behavior. In contrast, NP and LG organizations 
have broad and often complex objectives concerning various facets of the product and, akin to the problem of 
incentives in multi-tasking situations (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), cannot offer their executives simple 
incentive schemes to pursue these objectives (Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999), 12  which, in turn, lowers 
executives’ motivation to manage as well as their ability to proffer lower-level employees incentives that induce 
effectively desirable behavior in a multi-objective environment. Consequently, FP firms will tend to rely more 
on variable financial incentives than their NP and LG counterparts.  
Monitoring may substitute for incentives (Prendergast, 2002). Relying less on incentives linked to 
performance may propel NP and LG organizations to monitor more aspects of worker behavior, as compared to 
FP firms. However, unlike provision of incentives, monitoring requires more effort on the part of supervisors 
and higher-level managers, which may not be forthcoming at the optimal level. NP and LG organizations have 
another organizational tool at their disposal to compensate for their limitations in the provision of variable 
financial incentives and monitoring. They may offer efficiency wages – pay above the market rate – which can 
be implemented through higher pay rates or better fringe benefits. Efficiency wages may (a) induce employees 
to work harder for the fear of being caught shirking through monitoring (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), (b) 
motivate them to return the gift of above-market wage by working harder (Akerlof, 1980), or (c) attract better 
workers (Weiss, 1991). In order to support the effectiveness of efficiency wages, NP and LG may (a) invest 
more in monitoring compliance, if supervisors can evaluate the work that employees carry out, as in the case of 
nurses where supervisors work side-by-side with their subordinates, (b) select employees who are likely to be 
more responsive to the gift-giving and reciprocity aspects of efficiency wages, that is, more intrinsically-
motivated employees, and (c) pay better in order to attract better-motivated workers who do not require variable 
incentives to perform well.  However, employee self-selection will not necessarily attract the right employees 
(with all job applicants willing to profess intrinsic motivation and belief in the hiring organization’s mission and 
 
12 The law also prohibits tying NP and LG managers’ compensation to profits. 
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vision). In a job market where the quality of information about job applicants is “subtle, nuanced and difficult to 
verify,” social networks become preferable sources to impersonal ones to obtain reliable information about 
prospective employees (Granovetter, 2005, p. 33). Therefore, to screen applicants for their belief in an 
organization’s mission, organizations may rely on their current employees, who may tap into their social 
networks to identify new key workers. Current employees may know their acquaintances’ values in ways that 
screening by human resources staff cannot replicate. 
In sum, the key elements of organization structure are predicted to differ, with NP and LG organizations 
delegating more decision-making to their employees, providing them with less direct incentives but more 
efficiency wages, monitoring them more, and recruiting them more often through the social networks of current 
workers than their FP counterparts. 
  
(c) Pressures for similarity in structure and performance  
The factors associated with organization type discussed above tend to generate differences in structure 
and performance. However, there are also strong pressures for similarity. Competition will force organizations 
to provide relatively similar combinations of product dimensions of interest to consumers (Steinberg, 1987). If 
consumers are not aware of the problem of asymmetric information or do not recognize differences among 
types of organization, then even organizations that do not want to take advantage of asymmetric information 
will be forced to do so and all organizations will provide identical products.13 Government regulation is another 
force towards similarity in performance; in nursing homes, for example, various federal, state and local agencies 
establish and seek to enforce uniform practices and minimum standards of care. Professional workers, who 
receive similar training, are members of similar professional organizations and move across types of 
organization within the same industry constitute another force pushing towards similarity in structure and 
performance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
Similarity may also arise from broad economic, technological and other developments that reduce the 
demand for alternative types of organization. Whereas historically-specific market failures have given rise to 
different types of organization, these may have changed with increased availability of information, competition, 
regulation, and other factors that weaken the need for different types of organization (Ben-Ner, 2002). 
Organizations of different types may grow increasingly alike in both structure and performance, although they 
may retain their initial designation of type due to various forces of inertia. 
 
III. Data and Variables  
 
13 This is, of course, a typical Akerlof-type ‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970) whereby bad products squeeze out good products. NP 
and LG organizations may cross-subsidize the desirable unobservable quality elements if they have special sources of income (James, 
1983). 
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In this section we first provide some background information about nursing homes and their services. 
Next, we describe the datasets, sources and variables used in the analyses of organization structure and 
performance.  
 
(a) The nursing home industry  
A nursing home is a residence for individuals with physical or mental problems that prevent them from 
living on their own. Residents receive meals and assistance with daily activities as well as medical care but not 
of the intense kind provided by a hospital. The average nursing home in the United States has 109 beds and 93 
residents. Most nursing homes operate separately from hospitals, but some are affiliated with one. Some nursing 
homes specialize in different types of care or medical conditions, but the majority of homes have residents with 
diverse medical conditions and ages. A little over half of nursing homes are part of a chain, and the rest are 
independent facilities. Of the 16,100 nursing homes in 2004, 61.5% were FP and 30.8% NP. The remaining 
homes were LG owned (city and county), with a small number of state and federal government-owned homes, 
mostly for military veterans.14 The approximately 400 nursing homes in Minnesota have broadly the same 
characteristics as the national ones (82 residents on average, 51% belong to chains), except that the ownership 
distribution is skewed in favor of NP organizations. In Minnesota, only 27% of homes are FP and 60% are NP, 
whereas about 12% are LG owned. LG homes are independent of higher levels of government (at the state and 
federal levels). The few state-owned nursing homes are excluded from our analysis. 
Nursing homes are subject to state and federal regulations that prescribe certain minimum practices 
concerning standards of care, housing, food and more. Regulators collect information about residents, staffing, 
quality of care and other matters, perform scheduled and unannounced inspections, issue letters of deficiencies 
when regulations are not met, and sometimes impose fines.15 Regulations, inspections, data collection and 
dissemination and other means are required because residents are typically frail and vulnerable individuals who 
often enter a nursing home under the duress of a medical event that necessitates removal from their own homes, 
usually after first receiving intensive care in a hospital. Residents are commonly in a position of informational 
and power disadvantage for reasons of limited cognitive capacity. For example, most residents cannot evaluate 
the care they receive except in extremis (e.g., not receiving attention of nursing staff despite repeated requests), 
and cannot object effectively to being medicated with sedatives in order to make them more pliant or to be put 
to bed early. Family members cannot observe the substantive aspects of the care their relatives receive, thus 
 
14 The statistics reported in this paragraph are drawn from National Center for Health Statistics (2004), Table 1.  
15 Practically all nursing homes (98.5% nationally) have residents who benefit from the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs 
hence they are all subject to these regulations. “Under contract with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), states 
conduct annual nursing home inspections, known as surveys, to assess compliance with federal quality and safety requirements. States 
also investigate complaints filed by family members or others in between annual surveys. When state surveys find serious deficiencies, 
CMS may impose sanctions to encourage compliance with federal requirements” (GAO, 2005). 
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being reduced to observe facilities and other factors that can be gleaned during visits but which may bear only 
little on the nature and quality of care. This puts family members, who generally make nursing home decisions, 
at a great informational disadvantage. 
Most observers agree that regulation raises the standards of care beyond which would prevail otherwise, 
and improvements in data collection and enforcement have dramatically changed the situation as compared to 
that reported by Vladeck (1980). However, the problem of asymmetric information runs deep and it is hard even 
for professionally-trained observers to detect all problems. In its December 2005 report to the US Congress, the 
Government Accountability Office summarizes some of its findings as follows. “In the five large states we 
reviewed, federal surveyors concluded that the state surveyors had missed serious deficiencies in from 8 percent 
to 33 percent of comparative surveys—that is, these deficiencies existed and should have been identified at the 
time of the state survey… [A] sample of deficiencies demonstrated considerable understatement of quality-of-
care problems such as serious, avoidable pressure sores.” Moreover, enforcement is imperfect, so that homes 
found to violate regulations, even if they have done so repeatedly, are not always penalized (GAO, 2007).  
Nursing homes provide personal care to individuals who find themselves in unfamiliar surroundings in 
the company of strangers around the clock and dependent on others – the nursing staff as well as other residents 
– for most of their physical, social and emotional needs. This relational element is likely to be important to 
residents but largely invisible to outsiders, including regulators and family members, and difficult to 
communicate for reasons discussed earlier as well as because of the ‘subjective’ nature of this dimension. 
 
(b) Data sources and variables  
 The performance data are drawn from multiple regulatory sources concerning nearly all nursing homes 
in Minnesota in 2006; organization structure information is drawn from responses to a survey that was 
administered in 2005-6 to all Minnesota nursing homes. Description of the variables, descriptive statistics, and 
data sources are presented in Table 1.  
 
1. Organizational performance dataset 
Our performance data are drawn from regulatory sources concerning all nursing homes in Minnesota: 
(1) Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting database of the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (OSCAR), (2) Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) and (3) Minnesota Department of Human 
Services (MDHS). The OSCAR dataset provides information about nursing home ownership, capacity, nursing 
inputs, violation of regulations, health condition of residents, and more; the data are collected in accordance 
with federal laws and regulations, supplemented by Minnesota laws and regulations.16 The MDH data include 
 
16 The OSCAR data are described in many places; see, for example, GAO (2005).  
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nursing home quality indicators constructed from the Minimum Data Set Assessment (MDS) reported regularly 
by nursing homes. There are 23 quality indicators adjusted for resident case mix, covering diverse areas and 
dimensions of care such as psychosocial, continence, infections, accidents, nutrition, pain, skin care, 
psychotropics, and functioning. MDHS data include resident satisfaction with their nursing home derived from 
a survey administered to a sample of residents in every Minnesota nursing home.17 The resident survey contains 
13 measures of resident satisfaction, adjusted for a home’s resident case-mix.18 The OSCAR and MDH & 
MDHS datasets were linked for the year 2006 for 369 homes, of which 99 are FP, 221 are NP, and 49 are LG 
owned.19 We also linked 2000 U.S. Census data on each nursing home’s ZIP code area to include the variable 
of average income of the local population.20
We use the number of residents as the measure of the quantity produced by a nursing home.21 The 
average home in our sample has 82 residents, the smallest 15 residents, and the largest 458 residents; NP homes 
are the largest, followed by FP and LG homes. We employ several measures that capture different dimensions 
of quality and relational elements; these measures can be observed to different degrees by residents, family 
members, and regulators, so they arguably span a spectrum between observable Type I dimensions and 
unobservable Type II dimensions. We selected the variables so as to reflect our theoretical priors; the selection 
was also guided by a desire to use alternative data sources. 
We use two variables as measures of relatively observable elements of nursing home performance: 
prevalence of infections and prevalence of falls among residents, both from the MDH database. Infections and 
falls are relatively easy to observe through normal interaction by visiting family with residents during regular 
visits, hence we think of these variables as comparatively observable quality elements. The prevalence of 
infections variable is the ratio of the number of different kinds of infections (pneumonia, respiratory infection, 
septicemia, viral hepatitis, wound infection, recurrent lung aspirations, and urinary tract infection) to the total 
number of residents in the nursing home within a standard time frame (since the most-recent full non-admission 
 
17 Minnesota is one of a few states that administer such a survey; the first survey was administered in 2005. 
18 The 13 measures include safety, food enjoyment, control over living environment, satisfaction, and relationships (measures we use 
in the empirical work), as well as comfort, privacy, dignity, spiritual well-being, meaningful activity, autonomy, individuality, and 
mood. Residents are interviewed during a site visit and are asked to respond in one of the three manners: generally yes, generally no, 
and don’t know/not applicable/no response. All measures are adjusted to reflect resident and facility characteristics (Minnesota 
Department of Health, 2006). 
19 We obtained the OSCAR dataset from the Medicare.gov website that contains home inspection data up to January 2008. The MDH 
home quality rating data were collected during the period between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the third quarter of 2006. The 
MDHS resident interview was conducted in July to August 2006. To match up the two data sources, we extracted home inspection 
data from OSCAR in the time frame between November 2005 and December 2006. For those homes that were inspected twice during 
the period, we used the information from the later inspection.  
20 Although we do not have information about the areas from which a particular home’s residents are drawn, generally residents are 
drawn from locales near the nursing home. We use population characteristics in a home’s ZIP code to approximate the characteristics 
of the population from which the home’s residents are drawn. 
21 The number of residents is a count at the time of the regulatory survey. The distribution of the dates (month) when the three types of 
organization were surveyed does not differ statistically. Another common measure of quantity in nursing homes is the annual number 
of “patient-days” (e.g., McKay, 1988).  
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assessment for all kinds of infections, except for urinary tract infection, which is in the last 30 days before the 
current assessment). The prevalence of falls variable is the ratio of the number of accidental falls to the total 
number of residents in the nursing home within a standard time frame (in the last 30 days before the current 
assessment). The two variables are risk adjusted to account for residents’ gender, age, length of stay and prior 
health condition. The infections variable has a mean of 0.11, a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 0.33; the 
falls variable has a mean of 0.12, a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 0.25.; the means of these variables vary 
only slightly among FP, NP and LG homes (see panel I of Table 1 and footnote 6 therein; t-tests of means of 
variables, comparing NP versus FP and LG versus FP are indicated by asterisks on the means of NP and LG). 
We sought to investigate additional quality elements that can be assessed, with some effort and time, by 
family members during regular visits. We constructed three variables from resident surveys reported in the 
MDHS database concerning food enjoyment (the degree to which residents like the food), safety (the degree to 
which residents feel that they and their belongings are safe), and adaptation to the living environment (the 
extent to which residents feel that their immediate physical environment is comfortable). Family members may 
see and taste the food served to residents, and visit their rooms to judge the safety and comfort they provide. 
These measures thus can be thought of as partially observable elements. All three variables show higher means 
in NP and LG than in FP homes (statistically significant). 
The number of regulatory deficiencies variable from the OSCAR database is the sum of 28 deficiency 
categories with over 150 regulatory standards that nursing homes must meet at all times, covering a wide range 
of aspects of resident life, from standards for the safe storage and preparation of food to protection of residents 
from physical or mental abuse and inadequate care practices. When an inspection team finds that a home does 
not meet a specific regulation, it issues a deficiency citation. The mean number of citations is 13, with 17 homes 
having no citations; the maximum number of citations is 39; FP homes have on average slightly more 
deficiencies than NP homes, and LG homes have least, but the differences are not statistically significant. This 
variable represents an aggregation of elements that vary in the degree of direct observability by family members 
or inference through discussion with residents. However, these elements are carefully studied by government 
inspectors; as noted earlier, government audits claim that not all deficiency are detected, further testimony to the 
unobservability problem. This suggests the possibility that underreporting of deficiencies will be correlated with 
the degree of unobservability of the elements that are subject to inspection, hence differences among types of 
organizations will tend to be underestimated. Data on individual homes drawn from regulatory inspections were 
made public on the internet in 2004 and will likely alleviate some of the asymmetric information and affect the 
decision-making of some consumers. However, at present the effect appears to be very small. A focus-group 
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2006) reports that patients and their 
family members were generally unaware of or found it difficult to use sources such as Medicare’s Nursing 
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Home Compare website to facilitate the home selection process in a timely fashion.  We thus think of the 
regulatory deficiencies variable as an index of moderately unobservable quality elements.22 
Drug use is crucial to residents’ health and thus an important aspect of nursing home care quality. 
However, information about drug use is usually opaque to residents, many of whom receive a large number of 
medications at different times of the day administered by a nurse. The administration of antipsychotic drugs 
without a diagnosis of psychosis is usually regarded with suspicion by experts; misuse of antipsychotic drugs in 
nursing homes has long been documented in the medical and public health literature (e.g., Ray, Federspiel and 
Schaffner, 1980; Avorn and Gurwitz, 1995). Such drugs may be used to pacify demanding residents and free up 
nursing staff to care for other residents. If antipsychotic drugs are indeed used for such purposes, then the 
variable measures unobservable undesirable quality elements of nursing home outcomes.23 The variable is the 
ratio of the number of antipsychotic medications administered with a physician’s prescription but without a 
diagnosis of psychosis during the last 7 days before the current assessment to the total number of residents in 
the nursing home. 24  This variable, collected by the MDH from drug prescription records, is adjusted for 
residents’ gender, age and length of stay. The mean is 0.17, with a minimum 0.02 to a maximum of 0.81; the 
mean of this variable is highest for FP homes, and NP homes have the lowest incidence (statistically significant 
differences). 
We also included two measures of relational elements from the resident survey: satisfaction captures the 
extent to which residents are satisfied with their social lives in the nursing home (mean 81.74, minimum 71.56 
and maximum 89.92), and relationship is the degree to which residents report that there is a social, emotional 
and affective relationship between them and nursing staff as well as other residents (mean 81.94, minimum 
66.32 and maximum 90.14). These two variables are also risk-adjusted for residents’ characteristics and health 
conditions. These elements are unobservable to family members and are unlikely to be reported in a way that 
can be used for evaluation of a home; after all, being in a nursing home is a bad state, little fun, and for many, a 
 
22 A simple count of regulatory deficiencies assigns equal weight to deficiencies in diverse areas whose relative importance cannot be 
assessed. We experimented with alternative definitions of this variable, including only some of the 28 deficiency categories, and the 
findings reported in the next section are robust to many alternative specifications. Te number of deficiencies in certain categories is 
small and there is little variation, so in some specifications of the variable no differences across types of organization are detected. 
23 Through regulatory interventions the situation might improve at times (e.g., Shorr, Fought and Ray, 1994), however, recently 
nursing homes have still seen a rise in prescription of antipsychotic drugs to their residents, and the appropriateness of the prescription 
is sometimes in doubt. A recent study using nationally representative data from the 2000–2001 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey 
found that 58% of nursing home residents nation-wide receiving antipsychotic drugs took doses exceeding maximum levels, received 
duplicative therapy, or had inappropriate indications. The study found that, along with the appropriate prescription of such 
medications for treating symptoms of, for example, dementia with aggressive behaviors and schizophrenia, antipsychotic drugs were 
also used inappropriately on residents under unnecessary conditions such as memory problems, nonaggressive behaviors, or 
depression without psychotic features (Briesacher, Limcangco, Simoni-Wastila, Doshi, Levens, Shea and Stuart, 2005).  
24 Prescription of antipsychotics with medical justification, such as for residents with schizophrenia, delusional and mood disorder, 
Tourette’s syndrome, Huntington’s disease, acute manic, affective psychosis, hallucinations, and so forth, are excluded from the 
calculation. 
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last stage that does not connote with satisfaction. The means of both variables are higher in NP and LG homes 
than in FP homes (statistically significant).  
In the estimations reported in the next section we control for the labor inputs of nursing staff, for 
registered nurses together with licensed practical nurses, and for certified nursing assistants. NP homes have the 
largest number of hours of both types of nursing staff, in part because they also have the largest number of 
residents. If we consider (instead of total hours) nursing staff hours per resident per day, we find that NP and 
LG homes have statistically significantly more nursing input per resident than FP homes.25 
Control variables. As noted earlier, there are no price differences among nursing homes except those 
associated with the condition of a resident (reflecting the differential need for care) and geographic location. We 
control for various observable characteristics of each nursing home which may affect the frequency of visits by 
family members, the extent of competitive pressure in a nursing home’s county, the degree to which operations 
may be standardized due to a home’s participation in a chain or being part of a hospital, and more. Specifically, 
we include chain status, hospital affiliation, the proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market 
competition,26 and per capita income in the ZIP code area where the nursing home is located as a representative 
of demographic characteristics of the home’s geographic area.27 More FP homes are part of a chain than NP 
homes, and nearly all LG homes are independent (of a chain). No FP homes are affiliated with a hospital (in 
Minnesota), but 16% of NP and 39% of LG are. There is no difference in the proportion of Medicare residents 
or the case mix index among the three types of nursing homes. LG homes are in areas of lower average incomes, 
as compared to FP homes, with NP homes in between these two.  
 
2. Organization structure  
In order to obtain information about elements of organization structure we developed and administered a 
survey, the Minnesota Nursing Homes Employer Survey (MNHES). The survey was administered to all nursing 
 
25  The distribution of nursing hours in the three types of organization is as follows: 
 NP LG FP 
The total number of hours of 
registered nurses and licensed 
practical nurses per resident per 
day 
1.30** 
(0.29) 
1.28 
(0.23) 
1.22 
(0.37) 
The total number of hours of 
certified nursing assistants per 
resident per day 
2.36*** 
(0.42) 
2.55*** 
(0.37) 
2.10 
(0.53) 
 ** two-tailed t-test p<0.05 
 *** two-tailed t-test p<0.01  
26 The degree of market competition a nursing home faces is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index within the county where 
the nursing home is located. For each nursing home we computed the ratio of the number of residents in the home to the total number 
of residents in all nursing homes within the home’s county; the total number of nursing home residents in the county proxies for total 
market demand.  
27 We assume that the demographics of the area represented by a nursing home’s ZIP code are representative of the demographics of 
the home’s residents. 
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homes identified in the OSCAR database in 2005,28 with follow-up surveys mailed to non-respondents twice in 
the spring of 2006; 121 responded to the survey,29  although because of missing information for different 
variables the usable sample size is 105: 69 NP, 18 FP, and 18 LG.30 The response rate of approximately one-
third is quite good in comparison with similar surveys. 
The survey was addressed to nursing home administrators.31 Several items focused on practices aimed at 
core employees, the nursing staff, which consists of registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and certified 
nursing assistants. We constructed five variables that represent the organizational structure that affects the work 
of the nursing staff: delegation of decision-making, monitoring, selection, efficiency wages, and financial 
incentives. The measures represent weighted averages of survey responses reflecting each nursing group 
separately; the weighting is based on the number of employees in each group, with the exception of delegation 
of decision-making measure, which was constructed from responses that already lump together all nursing staff. 
(We repeated the analysis separately for each nursing group, with very similar results to those reported below). 
Delegation of decision-making. The variable is an average of the reported degree of influence nursing 
employees have in seven areas: hiring of nursing staff, hiring of the executive director, expansion of facilities, 
change in services, menu planning, choosing of activities for residents, and determination of standards of care, 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extreme). The sample mean is 1.99 with a standard deviation of 0.53, with the 
highest value in LG followed closely by NP, with FP last (statistically significant differences). 
Selection. We asked about the main way for recruiting nursing staff, including ‘cold call’ by candidates, 
newspaper ads, online job services, referral by current employees, employment agencies and so on. We 
concentrate on referrals by current employees as an indicator of selection of employees through social networks. 
In our sample, 32% of nursing homes rely mainly on referrals, with the highest proportion in the NP group, then 
LG, and last, FP.32 
 
28 There were 409 homes in the OSCAR dataset, but the number of nursing homes has been declining (the rise of alternatives such as 
assisted living being one important reason), so by the time of the survey there were fewer than 400 homes. We do not know the exact 
number because not all undelivered surveys were returned, and some homes that were in the process of closing were still receiving 
mail. The 369 homes that were discussed in the previous subsection are the result of merging two datasets, so an unknown but small 
number of homes may not appear in both.  
29 The responding nursing homes are fairly representative of the entire population. Nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests show that 
respondents are similar to non-respondents in home characteristics such as total number of residents, chain status, hospital affiliation, 
proportion of Medicare residents and resident case mix, but FP homes are under-represented among respondents: the population 
ownership distribution is about 60% NP homes, 13% LG homes, and 27% FP homes, whereas survey respondents are about 61% NP, 
17 % LG, and 22% FP. These differences are not of great concern because our sample contains substantial variation that allows us to 
capture the relationships between the key variables of interest.  
30 We conducted nonparametric Mann-Whitney test comparing the 105 homes to those respondents who were left out of the analysis 
because of missing variables; the comparison involved organizational structure, home characteristics and external environment 
characteristics, and dimensions of performance. With the exception of home age and fringe benefits we did not find statistically 
significant differences.  
31 The survey is available at https://netfiles.umn.edu/users/benne001/www/papers/work-surv/Nursing-homes-survey.pdf. 
32 Several homes indicated more than one main recruiting method; if they included employee referral we classified them as selection 
through referral by current employees. 
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Efficiency wage (fringe benefits). We compared the hourly wage of each group of nurses in NP, LG and 
FP homes and found no statistically significant differences except for registered nurses in LG homes, who 
receive 8% more than their FP counterparts at the 0.10 significance level. However, total compensation, the 
measure of efficiency wages, includes fringe benefits such as pension plans, health insurance, paid vacation 
leave and paid sick leave. We do not have information about the monetary value of the fringe benefits nurses 
receive, but constructed two alternative measures, one that includes a count of all four benefits listed above, and 
another including only the major two benefits, pension plans and health plans. The variable including the four 
benefits has a sample mean of 3.64 and standard deviation of 0.63, whereas the variable based on two benefits 
has a mean of 1.72 and standard deviation of 0.52. Both measures show LG with the highest mean of benefits, 
followed by NP, then FP (statistically significant differences).33 
Monitoring. The variable is based on the extent to which the work of nursing employees is monitored 
and supervised by supervisors and managers, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extreme). The sample average is 
3.79, with a standard deviation of 0.79, with higher levels in NP and LG than FP (statistically significant 
differences). 
Financial incentives (merit-based pay raise). Standard pay-for-performance incentives are not used in 
nursing home environment because generally results cannot be associated with the actions of a particular nurse. 
Instead, nursing homes that do seek to use incentives may grant merit-based pay raises. Merit-based pay raises 
are typically based on broad performance evaluation criteria. In our sample, 26% of homes rely on merit for pay 
raises for nursing staff (alternative bases for pay raises include supervisor discretion, across-the-board, 
promotion, and seniority): 34% of FP firms, 31% of LG and 23% of NP homes. 
Control variables. We control for home characteristics that may be associated with various elements of 
organization structure, including size, measured by the total number of residents, chain status, and whether the 
nursing home is affiliated with a hospital. We also include the county-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann market 
concentration index to account for possible pressures or opportunities for learning that may drive nursing homes 
to adopt similar structures.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results 
As we have reported in the previous section, the descriptive statistics in Table 1 reveal differences 
among FP, NP and LG nursing homes. Regarding organization structure, we note that FP nurses have least 
influence, while LG nurses have most. Wage rates are essentially the same for all groups of nurses across the 
different types of ownership (with the exception of the LG advantage noted earlier). FP homes provide 
 
33 It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate why NP and LG organizations would prefer to offer the same base wage but higher 
levels of fringe benefits in order to achieve a better pay package than their FP counterparts. One possible explanation is a paternalistic 
attitude on the part of NP leaders. 
 
 
21
significantly fewer fringe benefits than their NP and LG counterparts (the difference appears also in the two-
benefit variable, not shown in the table). A higher proportion of FP homes rely on merit-based pay raises than 
NP and LG homes. NP and LG homes rely more on monitoring of nurses than FP homes. Finally, NP and LG 
homes rely more on recruiting new nurses through referral by current nurses than do FP homes.  
Regarding performance variables, for a crude efficiency comparison one may compare the number of 
hours of the two types of nursing inputs per resident and note, as we have done above (see also footnote 25, 
above) that  FP homes devote fewer nursing staff hours per resident than NP and LG homes. This is initial 
evidence suggestive of inferior productive efficiency in NP and LG homes, but we need of course to consider 
other dimensions of performance that also use nursing staff; indeed, some use this ratio as an indicator of 
quality. For other dimensions the pattern generally favors NP homes over FP counterparts, with LG homes 
generally in between these two. Furthermore, the differences in means increase with the presumed degree of 
unobservability: there is no statistically significant difference in the prevalence of falls and the difference in 
prevalence of infections is small, NP and LG homes perform better in other performance elements including 
food, safety, and adaptation to the living environment. Regulatory deficiencies show smaller difference but still 
in favor of NP homes, and the NP advantage is significantly higher in the comparison of prevalence of 
antipsychotics, and relational goods, resident satisfaction and resident satisfaction with relationships.  
The differences in means of variables representing organization structure and performance generally 
accord with our theoretical predictions. However, a more careful investigation is necessary because these 
differences may be spurious or generated by factors that differ across the three types of organization. The 
remainder of this section investigates in detail within the framework of regression analyses the differences in 
organization structure and performance among the three types of organization.  
 
(a) Organization structure 
To investigate differences in organization structure, we estimate separately the individual elements as a 
function of nursing home ownership and various control variables. To acknowledge the simultaneous 
determination of the elements and to account for the possibility of common sources of noise in the data, we use 
seemingly unrelated estimations. The results are shown in Table 2.  Compared to FP homes, NP homes have 
significantly more delegation of decision-making and provide significantly greater fringe benefits; they also rely 
more on network selection of new employees and monitor more their employees (the difference in both cases is 
significant only at the 0.10 level), and rely less on merit-based pay (statistically insignificant differences). The 
differences between LG and FP homes are similar to the difference between NP and FP homes, except that 
where the difference between NP and FP is only marginally significant (selection and monitoring) the 
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difference between LG and FP is statistically insignificant (the differences between NP and LG homes in these 
two elements are statistically insignificant).  
A very similar pattern of differences is detected if the five equations are estimated separately based on 
the characteristics of the dependent variables, using ordered-logit estimate for decision-making, logit estimate 
for network selection and merit-based pay, OLS for fringe benefits, and tobit estimate for monitoring. The 
significance levels are as in the SUR estimations presented in Table 2 (except that the significance of the 
estimate on NP in the selection equation increases).  
To examine the possible endogenous determination of the various elements of organization structure, we 
also implemented a three-stage simultaneous estimation (3SLS). This structural estimation reflects our 
theoretical framework for understanding the relationships among the various elements of organization structure, 
a discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this paper. The results (available upon request) are consistent 
with those in Table 2, with few differences (the estimate on monitoring becomes negative but loses statistical 
significance). 
 
(b) Organizational performance 
To predict the level of different elements of organizational performance and examine differences in 
performance across organizations with different ownership, we adopt a partial Cobb-Douglass production 
function framework. Each quantity or quality element - various nursing home outcomes - is produced by the 
inputs of the nursing staff, controlling for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of 
market competition, and per capita income in the ZIP code area, and is augmented by organization type 
dummies.34 The production function is partial because we do not have the inputs of non-nursing labor and 
capital.35 For outcome variables that vary with the size of a nursing home – the number of residents and the 
number of regulatory deficiencies – we represent the input of the nursing staff by the number of hours per day 
provided by registered nurses and licensed practical nurses and by certified assistant nurses. For quality 
outcomes where the quality of inputs may be critical, we use the proportion of the number of hours provided by 
registered and licensed practical nurses in the total number of nursing hours. 
We approach the estimation of performance in two stages. First, we predict separately various outcome 
measures in a seemingly unrelated regression framework (to account for the potential correlation of error terms 
among equations); the results are presented in Table 3. Next we allow for the possibility of tradeoffs between 
 
34 Recall from the description of variables that all quality performance outcomes are adjusted for resident case mix and in certain cases, 
where relevant, also for gender, age and length of stay. 
35 To understand the significance of the omission of other inputs, note that we are using the separate inputs of three different types of 
nursing staff, from highly-trained registered and licensed nurses to certified nursing assistants, who together account for 66% of 
nursing homes employment (Gabrel, 2000); nurses’ combined wages account for about 81% of nursing home revenue in our survey 
sample.  
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quantity and quality in production imposed by the alternative use of nursing staff time and effort; SUR 
estimation of quantity and two quality measures (the number of regulatory deficiencies and relationship) is 
presented in Tables 4a-4d.  
Table 3 reports the results for seemingly unrelated estimates, starting with quantity (the number of 
residents) and continuing with quality and relational elements arranged in decreasing order of observability by 
residents’ families. As explained in the section on data and variables, the degree of observability is based on our 
perceptions and is obviously subjective. The regression reported in Table 3 is well determined and the estimates 
on various variables are sensible (in particular, the estimate on the total hours of registered and licensed 
practical nurses is 0.454, S.E. 0.050) and on the hours of certified nursing assistants’ input is 0.436, S.E. 0.047). 
The first column shows that FP homes outperform both NP and LG homes in the number of residents they serve. 
The estimates are statistically significant, indicating 5.2% fewer residents served on average by NP homes and 
11% fewer in LG homes, as compared to FP homes.  
The diverse measures of quality exhibit a pattern of NP homes doing at least as well as FP homes on 
some measures, and outperforming them on others. On the one hand, compared to FP homes, NP homes provide 
as much or more of the desirable outcomes (food enjoyment, sense of safety, sense of adaptation to the living 
environment, general satisfaction and satisfaction with relationships in the home, all measures derived from 
resident surveys). On the other hand, NP homes have less of the undesirable outcomes (measures reported by 
nursing homes or recorded by regulators) than FP homes, including fewer regulatory deficiency citations and 
fewer administrations of antipsychotic drugs that were not prescribed for a diagnosed condition (significant at 
0.1 level); the other two undesirables, falls and infections, are not distinguishable between the two types of 
organization. Quality-related outcomes in LG homes are quite similar to NP homes, although generally not 
quite as good on the undesirable measures.36 
These results may be summarized as follows. Given a certain nursing staff, FP homes serve larger 
numbers of residents than NP and especially LG homes, hence are more efficient. However, FP homes 
generally provide lower quality care, especially for less observable attributes, than NP homes, and more 
moderately, less than LG homes. These findings generally support our prediction that FP homes will be more 
efficient and also more willing to exploit asymmetric information than NP and LG homes. However, this 
 
36 We used the prevalence of back pressure sores from the OSCAR dataset as an alternative measure to the unobservable element. 
Pressure sores have been used in the literature as an indicator of nursing home quality that is unobservable to family members, 
particularly of immobile residents (e.g., Cawley, Grabowski and Hirth, 2004; Grabowski and Hirth, 2003). There are three alternative 
measures (described in Table 1): the proportion of high-risk long-stay residents with back pressure sores, the proportion of low-risk 
long-stay residents with back pressure sores, and the proportion of short-stay residents with back pressure sores. For various reasons, 
data is not available for all nursing homes (there are 252, 106, and 180 homes with data for these three variables, respectively). Results 
show that NP homes consistently have a lower proportion of residents with back pressure sores (not significant for the two long-stay 
measures, but significant at the 0.10 level for the short-stay measure). No significant difference is detected in the comparison between 
LG and FP homes. 
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interpretation may be contrasted with the alternative interpretation that these findings reflect a tradeoff between 
quantity and quality. Under this interpretation, it is not differences in efficiency or willingness to exploit 
informational advantages that differentiates among types of organization, but the type of service or market niche 
different types of organization serve. Thus FP homes are in the higher quantity/lower quality niche and they 
allocate their resources (primarily nurses) to serve larger number of residents, whereas NP homes are in the 
lower quantity/higher quality niche supported by a suitable resource allocation, and LG similar to NP homes. 
This interpretation requires price differentials to reflect the quality differentials, but as noted already, in 
Minnesota there are no price differentials.  Alternatively, this interpretation may apply even in the absence of 
price differentials if potential residents or their families (and third-party payers) are unaware of quality 
differences because of asymmetric information or do not care about them, or if they cannot choose a nursing 
home (e.g., because of location considerations). 
To explore the possibility of a tradeoff between quantity and quality, and between different elements of 
quality, we estimated quantity as a function of the variables in the first column of Table 3 but added quality 
measures as explanatory variables, and estimated measures of quality as in Table 3, adding measures of quantity 
and quality as explanatory variables. We report here the estimation of the relationship between the number of 
residents, regulatory deficiencies, and satisfaction with relationships. Regulatory deficiencies and satisfaction 
with relationships represent different aspects of quality and relational elements, and are derived from different 
data sources. These three variables appear to exhaust many, possibly most, possibilities of using the two kinds 
of nursing input for alternative purposes and thus capture well the tradeoff issue that we seek to investigate.37 
We explore tradeoffs in four separate SUR estimations, one in a three-way tradeoff possibility that considers the 
number of residents, regulatory deficiencies and relationship together (Table 4a), and then two-way tradeoffs 
(Tables 4b, 4c and 4d) that are open to a more direct interpretation. 
Table 4a shows the relationships among three variables that compete for the same nursing inputs. Strict 
tradeoff relationships cannot be determined in this set of three-way equations, but certain conclusions may be 
drawn. Consider the first column estimating the number of residents as function of the number of regulatory 
deficiencies and relationship, as well as organization type and control variables. A mild tradeoff can be detected, 
with the sign on the estimate on regulatory deficiencies, an undesirable outcome, is positive and the sign on the 
estimate on relationship is negative. In the second column we detect competition between the number of 
residents and relationship on the one hand, and regulatory deficiencies, on the other hand. The third column 
shows a tradeoff between relationship and the number of residents but no relationship to deficiencies. This set 
of estimates suggests that higher quality comes, at the margin, at the expense of serving fewer residents (serving 
more residents implies lower quality of service), although we can conclude much about the tradeoff between the 
 
37 It would not make sense to include in the estimation of tradeoffs all the variables in Table 3, because many are jointly produced. 
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two dimensions of quality. The finding of a tradeoff between quantity and quality does not imply that the 
alternative interpretation adduced in the previous paragraph regarding different niches is correct. The tradeoff 
finding only means that the organizations in the sample operate, at least in a limited way, in an economic way if 
not necessarily at maximum efficiency. Importantly, after controlling for the possibility of tradeoffs, the NP and 
LG estimates remain at approximately the levels estimated in Table 3, suggesting that the efficiency differences 
and quality differences remain. Hence on the basis of Table 4a we cannot accept the alternative interpretation 
that FP, NP and LG operate on the same tradeoff (production possibilities) curve but at different locations and 
that there are no other differences. Table 4a is consistent with our predictions. 
To obtain additional information about the issue of tradeoffs we estimated sets of two equations 
determining only two outcomes at a time. Tables 4b and 4c confirm previous findings: first, that there is a 
tradeoff between the number of residents and quality, one dimension at a time, and second, that the differences 
among the three types of organization that we found in Table 3 are detected here as well. In Table 4d we 
examine the issue of tradeoff between the two dimensions of quality, the number of regulatory deficiencies and 
relationship. We do not find a tradeoff, but that high quality in one dimension is associated with high quality in 
the other dimension, just as low quality in one is associated with low quality in the other. This suggests that an 
emphasis on quantity comes at the expense of quality in both dimensions examined here. The differences 
among types of organization are reproduced here, too.  
We attempted to examine the endogenous determination of the outcome variables included in Tables 4a-
4d in a structural 3SLS estimation. The estimations (available upon request) are poorly determined, especially 
the three-way tradeoffs system.  The problem stems from unavailability of satisfactory instruments, on which 
could not improve because of lack of alternative measures in our datasets.  
Differences among different sub-types of FP firms and NP organizations. In the foregoing discussion we 
treated FP, NP and LG organizations as prototypical organizations and ignored possible variations within each 
type that may affect the severity of agency problems as well as organizational objectives.38 We replicated the 
analysis of Table 3, distinguishing between chain and autonomous FP and NP homes. Here we are not 
interested in developing and testing hypotheses about the effects of chain versus independent ownership in NP 
and FP, but only want to test the robustness of our previous findings to the inclusion of chain ownership. The 
results (reported in Appendix A) suggest that although there are differences between chain and independent FP 
 
38 In all prior analyses we include a dummy for chain, but it did not differentiate between FP and NP chains. For example, a FP home 
that belongs to a chain may have a longer principal-agent chain and therefore experience more severe agency problems than an owner-
controlled local home, with implications for both technical efficiency and the willingness to take advantage of asymmetric 
information; likewise, the operations of a locally-controlled NP organization may be more visible to its board and stakeholders and its 
objectives may be more aligned with community desires than would be the case with a large organization that has facilities in many 
communities.  
 
 
26
                                                
homes as well as between chain and independent NP homes, the broad differences between NP and FP homes 
carry over also to the further classification that includes chain ownership.39 
One hears the argument that religious institutions are populated by more intrinsically-motivated and 
dedicated employees, such as nuns, than in other NP organizations. On this argument, religious NP nursing 
homes will show less inefficiency and perhaps a relative gain in the relational elements as compared to secular 
NP homes. We split the NP sample by secular and religious homes, and replicated the estimation reported in 
Table 3. The results (presented in Appendix B) show great similarity between secular and religious NP homes, 
although the religious ones appear indeed marginally more effective and less likely to administer antipsychotics 
drugs than secular ones, the differences between the two sub-types of NP homes are statistically insignificant.40 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a comparative theoretical perspective on the structure and performance of 
for-profit, nonprofit and local government (FP, NP and LG) organizations. These three types of organization 
have different ownership structures and different objectives and therefore they are likely to face different 
governance issues, recruit different kinds of employees, encounter different agency problems, and perform 
differently on a wide range of measures. Our argument is that, in comparison with FP firms, NP and LG 
organizations:  
(1) have more attenuated ownership claims and therefore suffer more severe agency problems and 
although these problems are mitigated by their choice of organization structure, they are not eliminated, leading 
to lower productive efficiency in NP and LG organizations; however, recruiting of and self-selection by some 
managers and employees who support these organizations’ goals may attenuate (and even reverse) this effect; 
(2) focus on consumer well-being rather than profit maximization and therefore take less advantage of 
consumer vulnerabilities such as inferior information and ceteris paribus provide higher-quality products.  
We investigated empirically the implications of these hypothesized differences, focusing on a narrowly-
defined and homogenous industry where all three types of organization coexist, nursing homes. Concerning 
organization structure, our analysis of responses to an original employer surveys provided by 105 Minnesota 
nursing homes provides broad support to our predictions. The analysis suggests that, as compared to FP homes, 
NP homes delegate more decision-making power to their employees, provide them with efficiency wages (via 
greater fringe benefits), tend to hire them through social networks; in addition, they monitor employees slightly 
more and are slightly less likely to offer them financial incentives. LG homes are somewhere between NP and 
 
39 Not that in the Appendix C table the omitted category is independent FP homes, whereas in Table 3 is all FP homes. Appendix C 
comparisons suggest that most hypotheses regarding the differences between FP and NP carry over to various sub-type FP and NP 
comparisons. Such a detailed comparison is beyond the scope of this paper. 
40 The only statistically significant difference is found for the food enjoyment variable, where religious homes have an advantage over 
secular ones (p<0.10). 
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FP homes in terms of their organization structure. There is very little relevant research on nursing homes and 
other industries against which we can compare this set of results. One exception is DeVaro and Brookshire 
(2007), who use an employer survey concerning promotion and incentive practices in FP firms and NP 
organizations. They find that NP organizations are less likely to offer promotions, and the promotions that they 
do offer are less likely to be based on job performance or merit. Furthermore, echoing the findings of Roomkin 
and Weisbrod (1999) and Bertrand, Hallock and Arnould (2005) for hospital executives, DeVaro and 
Brookshire (2007) find that NP workers are less likely to receive commissions on sales, bonuses and profit 
sharing than their FP counterparts. These results are weakly consistent with our results, in that the weak 
differences between FP on the one hand and NP and LG homes on the other hand, although in the predicted 
direction, are weaker than those found in other industries most likely because there are few pay-for-performance 
opportunities in the nursing home environment. Our finding regarding efficiency wages echoes Ito and 
Domian’s (1987) finding that NP orchestras paid musicians higher wages than their FP counterparts, who 
explained the difference as an efficiency wage due to less measurable outcomes in NPs. These differences arise 
from NP organizations’ need and opportunity to delegate decision-making to workers in lower rungs of the 
hierarchy, and the need to motivate them in the absence of the overall profit motive for the organization.  
Regarding performance and outcomes, our empirical investigation of a sample of 369 nursing homes in 
Minnesota, using data collected by regulatory agencies, provides support for our theoretical predictions. 
Nursing homes provide services that have elements that are observable by consumers or their sponsors – 
residents or their families – as well as elements that are not observable, at least not by families. They also 
provide an important relational element present in any personal care industries, tender loving care – or 
otherwise – which also happens to be largely unobservable to families. Using a production function framework 
for each of the performance outcomes, we found that, as compared to FP homes, NP and LG homes (the latter 
to a lesser degree) provide better outcomes for residents, particularly so in terms of elements that are arguably 
less well observed by residents and their families. From resident overall satisfaction to satisfaction with their 
relationships in the home to the use of antipsychotic medication without a diagnosis requiring it, to the overall 
number of deficiencies identified by regulators, and more, NP homes provide better results than FP homes, with 
LG homes’ results lying in between these two. However, NP and LG homes are less efficient than FP homes in 
terms of standard productive efficiency measures.  
We examined the possibility that FP, NP and LG homes operate similarly in terms of efficiency and 
treatment of quality, but offer different combinations of quality and quantity dimensions of their service 
(although such possibility would make sense only if prices of different packages can differ, which they cannot, 
in Minnesota, if consumers are completely ignorant of quality differences, or if they cannot choose among 
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homes). We found that after controlling for the tradeoff between quantity and quality the differences between 
FP, NP, and LG homes generally remain.  
Our results are robust to most alternative econometric specifications and to classifications of types of 
ownership. For organization structure, we attempted structural estimation, which despite the small sample, 
produced similar results. For organization performance, we reproduced the general results when we 
distinguished between FP and NP chain and independent homes (separately), and when we considered 
separately secular and religious NP homes. We also attempted structural estimation and most of the results were 
reproduced, but in some specifications efficiency differences between FP and NP and LG disappear. It is 
impossible to determine whether this is because of the sensitivity of 3SLS estimation to specification and the 
choice of instruments, or because there are no efficiency differences.  
Our findings are similar to those we reviewed in the Introduction section, and to findings from the 
hospital industry. In these industries it appears that FP firms are more efficient than NP organizations (e.g., 
Nyman and Bricker, 1989; Kessler and McClellan, 2002), but NP organizations produce higher quality of care 
as compared to FP status (e.g., Rosenau and Linder, 2003). Horwitz (2007) finds that NP hospitals produce 
different services than their FP counterparts along dimensions where administrators can influence profitability, 
consistent with differences in objectives; Picone, Chou and Sloan (2002) find that hospitals converting from NP 
or LG status to FP status are associated with decline of quality (mortality), but not the other way around; 
Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986), Spector, Selden and Cohen (1998), Hirth (1999), Chou (2002), Grabowski 
and Hirth (2003) and Santerre and Vernon (2005) find that NP nursing homes provide services in a way that 
exploits less consumer informational disadvantages than do FP homes. Since price is closely regulated in the 
nursing home industry, and more so in Minnesota as one of only two states (along with North Dakota) that 
require rate equalization between privately-paid and Medicaid residents, nursing homes do not have latitude to 
adjust their rates to match the costs of their enhanced services and quality (O’Neill et al., 2003). Therefore, the 
differences between FP firms and NP and LG organizations appear to be driven by differences in objectives 
rather than by the possibility that different types of organizations specialize in low-price—low-quality versus 
high–price—high-quality market segments.41 
Are the differences among structure and performance among different types of organization sustainable 
on the long run? We have not addressed this interesting question, except to observe that the factors that generate 
demand for alternatives to FP firms, asymmetric information in particular, may diminish over time. Further 
investigation of this question is required. For example, one important question is whether there is substantial 
self-selection by customers into different types of organization. Self-selection may be based on recognition by 
customers (residents or their families who place them in nursing homes) that asymmetric information between 
 
41 Horwitz and Nichols (2007) provide detailed discussion and evidence on differences in the objectives of NP and FP hospitals. 
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providers of care and recipients of care cannot be eliminated, leading some customers to make the selection of a 
nursing home on the basis of organizational type, with those fearing the consequences of asymmetric 
information opting for NP and LG homes over FP ones. On the long run, with Internet information about 
nursing homes already available and more to become available in the future, and with the increase of public 
awareness of and ability to use online information, asymmetric information will be temporary and isolated, 
hence the advantages of NP and LG organizations will dissipate, and to the extent that their principals choose to 
keep them in business, there will be increasingly fewer differences between them and FP homes. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions, Sources and Summary Statistics 
   
  Variable Name Variable Definition Sample Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Sample 
Range 
NP Mean 
(S.D.) 
LG Mean 
(S.D.) 
FP Mean 
(S.D.) 
Data 
source1 
 
I. Variables for Organization Performance Estimations - 369 Nursing Homes 
 
Organization Type        
NP  1- nonprofit  
0-otherwise 
0.60 0/1 - - - OSCAR 
LG 1- local government  
0- otherwise 
0.13 
 
0/1 - - - OSCAR 
FP  1- for-profit  
0- otherwise 
0.27 
 
0/1 - - - OSCAR 
        
Organization Performance        
Number of residents Total number of residents  81.99 
(48.19) 
15-458 88.15** 
(50.91) 
62.84** 
(35.26) 
77.73 
(44.80)      
OSCAR 
Regulatory deficiencies Total number of regulatory deficiencies. Examples of violations include failure to: 
“provide enough notice before discharging or transferring a resident,” “give each 
resident care and services to get or keep the highest quality of life,” “prepare food that is 
nutritional, appetizing, tasty, attractive, well-cooked…,” “provide clean bed and bath 
linens that are in good condition,” “protect each resident from all abuse, physical 
punishment…,” “provide care in a way that keeps or builds each resident's dignity and 
self respect,” “give each resident care and services to get or keep the highest quality of 
life,” “use a registered nurse at least 8 hours a day, 7 days a week,” and so on. 
13.09 
(6.69) 
0-39 13.01 
(6.77) 
12.84 
(5.71) 
13.38 
(7.01) 
OSCAR 
Prevalence of new falls Number of falls in the last 30 days (before the current assessment is conducted) to 
number of residents. 
0.12 
(0.03) 
0.01-0.25      0.12 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
MDH 
Prevalence of infections Number of pneumonia, respiratory infection, septicemia, viral hepatitis, wound infection, 
or recurrent lung aspirations since most-recent full non-admission assessment or urinary 
tract infection in the last 30 days (before the current assessment is conducted) to number 
of residents. 
0.11 
(0.04) 
0.01-0.33      0.12* 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.04) 
MDH 
Food enjoyment Items: “Do you like the food here?” “Do you enjoy mealtimes here?” and “Can you get 
your favorite foods here?”  
84.75 
(4.99) 
65.53-92.89  84.93** 
(4.84) 
86.09*** 
(4.58) 
83.68 
(5.36) 
MDHS 
Safety 
 
Items: “Are your belongings safe here?” “Do your clothes get lost or damaged in the 
laundry?” and “Do you feel safe and secure?”  
86.64 
(3.63) 
71.85-93.8   86.93** 
(3.34) 
86.94** 
(3.28) 
85.83 
(4.29)      
MDHS 
Environment 
 
Items: “Is it easy for you to get around in your room by yourself?” “Are your belongings 
arranged so you can get them?” “Can you get the things you want to use in your 
bathroom?” and Do you take care of your own things as much as you want?”  
88.26 
(3.02) 
76.75-94.17 88.54*** 
(2.86) 
88.19 
(3.33) 
87.67 
(3.13) 
MDHS 
Prevalence of antipsychotics Number of using antipsychotic medications without diagnosis of psychosis in the last 7 
days (before the current assessment is conducted) to number of residents. 
0.17 
(0.08) 
0.02-0.81     0.16*** 
(0.06) 
0.17* 
(0.08) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
MDH 
Satisfaction Items: “Is there somebody to talk to here if you have a problem?” “Do the people who 
work here spend enough time with you when giving you care?” “Do you understand the 
people who work here when they talk to you?” “Do the people who work here listen to 
what you say?” “Do the people who work here explain your care to you?” “Do you 
consider any of the other people who live here a friend?” “Do the people who work here 
knock on your door and wait to be invited in?” “Are you alone too much?” “Do the 
people who work here ever get angry at you?” “Would you recommend this nursing 
home to someone who needs care?” and “Overall, what grade would you give this 
nursing home, where A is best it could be and F is worst it could be?”  
81.74 
(3.36) 
71.56-89.92   82.15*** 
(3.11) 
82.33*** 
(3.17)       
80.52 
(3.70) 
MDHS 
Relationship Items: “Do the people who work here ever stop by just to talk?” “Do you consider 
anybody who works here to be your friend?” and “Can you get help when you need it?”  
81.94 
(4.24) 
66.32-90.14  82.27*** 
(4.11) 
82.80*** 
(3.87) 
80.76 
(4.48) 
MDHS 
Back pressure sores I ² Percent of high-risk long-stay residents who have pressure sores 7.81% 
(4.38%) 
0-22% 7.64% 
(4.31%) 
7.43% 
(2.83%) 
8.46% 
(5.02%) 
OSCAR 
Back pressure sores II ³ Percent of low-risk long-stay residents who have pressure sores 1.50% 0-7% 1.53% 1.29% 1.48% OSCAR 
(1.78%) (1.91%) (1.70%) (1.52%) 
Back pressure sores III 4 Percent of short-stay residents who have pressure sores 11.76% 
(6.76%) 
0-30% 11.04%** 
(6.52%) 
11.69% 
(7.58%) 
13.30% 
(6.93%) 
OSCAR 
        
Labor Inputs        
RNs and LPNs  Total number of hours of registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical nurses (LPNs) 
per day 
104.77 
(67.36) 
11.40-613.72 114.84*** 
(72.72) 
80.20* 
(48.54) 
94.46 
(58.12) 
OSCAR 
CNAs Total number of hours of certified nursing assistants per day  190.43 
(117.51) 
9.76-966.38 207.81*** 
(122.10) 
158.62 
(88.58) 
167.37 
(113.23) 
OSCAR 
        
Control Variables        
Chain status 1 if the nursing home belongs to a chain operation; 0 if independent. 0.51 0/1 0.55* 0.02*** 0.65 OSCAR 
Hospital affiliation 1 if the facility is affiliated with a hospital; 0 otherwise 0.15 0/1 0.16*** 0.39*** 0 OSCAR 
Proportion of Medicare residents Proportion of residents whose stay is paid for by Medicare 0.09 
(0.05) 
0-0.41       0.09 
(0.05) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
OSCAR 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
HHIi = (100 2)
#
#
sNHresidentcounty
residentsNH i×  2455.08 (1943.78) 276.50-10000       2472.25 (1944.28)   3456.95*** (2138.38) 1920.85 (1634.38) OSCAR & ZIP 
code 
Case mix index5 Intensity of care and services provided to residents in each nursing home 1.01 
(0.09) 
0.60-1.30 1.01 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.06) 
1.02 
(0.11) 
MDH 
Per capita income in the ZIP code 
area ($) 
 20106.74 
(4927.23) 
9821-45402 19883.01*** 
(4570.52) 
17893.90*** 
(1999.42) 
21701.40 
(6097.65) 
2000 
Census 
 
 
II. Variables for Organization Structure Estimations – 105 Nursing Homes 
 
Organization Type         
NP 1- nonprofit  
0-otherwise 
0.66 0/1 - - - OSCAR 
LG 1- local government  
0- otherwise 
0.17 
 
0/1 - - - OSCAR 
FP 1- for-profit  
0- otherwise 
0.17 0/1 - - - OSCAR 
        
Organization structure         
Delegation of decision-making RNs, LPNs and CNAs’ participation in decision-making in (5-point scale,1-not at all to 
5-extreme): 
(1) Hiring of executive director or similar position; 
(2) Hiring of RNs, LPNs, and CNAs; 
(3) Expansion of facilities; 
(4) Change in the services offered; 
(5) Menu planning;  
(6) Choosing activities for residents; 
(7) Determination of standards for care of residents 
1.99 
(0.53) 
1-3.57 2.01*** 
(0.54) 
2.21*** 
(0.48) 
1.69 
(0.43) 
MNHES 
Selection of new employees 1 if referral by current employees was the main way through which the most recently 
hired nursing employee was first identified; 0 otherwise 
0.32 0/1 0.37** 0.25 0.16 MNHES 
Fringe benefits Number of fringe benefits (pension plan, health insurance, paid vacation leave and paid 
sick leave) received by most nursing employees (1-4) 
3.64 
(0.63) 
2-4 3.69*** 
(0.59) 
3.94*** 
(0.24) 
3.12 
(0.76) 
MNHES 
Monitoring of nursing staff The extent to which nursing employees have their work monitored and supervised by 
supervisors and managers? (1-not at all to 5-extreme) 
3.79 
(0.79) 
2-5 3.86* 
(0.79) 
3.79 
(0.74) 
3.51 
(0.85) 
MNHES 
Merit as basis for pay raise 1 if merit ranks as one of the top two criteria for determining individual nurse’s pay 
raise; 0 otherwise 
0.26 0/1 0.23 0.31 0.34 MNHES 
        
Control Variables        
Home size Total number of residents currently reside in the nursing home 79.84 
(40.88) 
19-207 82.64 
(39.35) 
67.89 
(34.84)    
81.06 
(51.32)      
MNHES 
& 
OSCAR 
Chain status 1 if the nursing home belongs to a chain operation; 0 if independent. 0.48 0/1 0.55 0.06*** 0.61 OSCAR 
Case mix index Intensity of care and services provided to residents in each nursing home 1.00 
(0.09) 
0.65-1.26 1.00 
(0.08) 
1.00 
(0.04)     
1.01 
(0.14) 
MDH 
Hospital affiliation 1 if the facility is affiliated with a hospital; 0 otherwise 0.15 0/1 0.12*** 0.44*** 0 OSCAR 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
HHIi = (100 2)
#
#
sNHresidentcounty
residentsNH i×  2474.74 (1709.64) 276.50-10000 2462.20 (1588.44)    2955.39* (2266.11)   2042.13 (1486.58)   OSCAR & ZIP 
code 
 
Notes:  
1. MNHES - Minnesota Nursing Homes Employer Survey; available at https://netfiles.umn.edu/users/benne001/www/papers/work-surv/Nursing-homes-survey.pdf  
    OSCAR - Online Survey, Certification and Reporting data of nursing facilities (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NursingHomeQualityInits/  
    MDH - Minnesota State Department of Health; details available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/nhreportcard/ 
    MDHS - Minnesota State Department of Human Services; details available at http://www.health.state.mn.us/nhreportcard/ 
2. 252 nursing homes (170 NP’s, 23 LG’s, and 59 FP’s). 
3. 106 nursing homes (68 NP’s, 7 LG’s, and 31 FP’s). 
4. 178 nursing homes (112 NP’s, 13 LG’s, and 53 FP’s). 
5.  For details on the definition and calculation of case mix see http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/fpc/profinfo/cms/8_21manual.pdf . 
6. *, ** and *** indicate significance of the one-tailed t- test at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for the comparison between NP and FP, and LG and FP nursing homes. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Organization Type and Structure: 
SUR Estimations  2,1
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Delegation of 
Decision-Making 
Selection  Efficiency Wages 
(Fringe Benefits) 
Monitoring Incentives 
(Merit-Based Pay) 
 
NP 
 
0.304** 
(0.135) 
 
 
0.209* 
(0.118) 
 
0.389*** 
(0.137) 
 
0.393* 
(0.206) 
 
-0.156 
(0.109) 
LG 0.421** 
(0.190) 
0.137 
(0.166) 
0.579*** 
(0.193) 
0.411 
(0.291) 
-0.228 
(0.154) 
      
Control variables ³ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 105 105 105 105 105 
χ² 11.75 4.87 24.39 5.37 8.90 
Prob>χ² 0.07 0.56 0.00 0.50 0.18 
“R-sq” 0.10 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.08 
  
 Notes: 
 1. Among the 105 nursing homes included in the analysis, 18 are FP, 69 NP and 18 LG. 
 2. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. 
 3. For all estimations we control for firm size (number of residents), chain, hospital affiliation, and degree of 
market competition. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Organization Type and Performance 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
 
    Quantity                                                                                                                         Quality 
 
                             Observable ?-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? Unobservable 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  
Residents 
Falls Infections 
 
Food  Safety Environment Regulatory 
Deficiencies 
Antipsychotics Satisfaction Relationship 
           
NP -0.052** 
(0.022) 
0.047 
(0.052) 
-0.018 
(0.063) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.268** 
(0.113) 
-0.140* 
(0.077) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.020** 
(0.008) 
           
LG -0.110*** 
(0.028) 
0.045 
(0.069) 
-0.126 
(0.082) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.090 
(0.147) 
-0.055 
(0.101) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
           
Inputs of RNs, 
LPNs and 
CNAs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Control 
variables 4 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 
χ² 5412.64 31.36 41.04 49.32 28.79 27.93 33.10 42.77 63.03 40.24 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.03 0.63 0.67 0.46 0.10 0.00 0.15 
“R-sq” 0.94 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 015 0.10 
   
Notes: 
1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 221 NP and 49 LG.  
2. All variables except for organization type, chain status and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. Estimations 
based on levels yield similar results. 
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. 
4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and per capita 
income in the ZIP code area. 
 
Table 4a. Organization Type and Performance, Controlling for  
Tradeoff between Quantity and Quality 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
   
 
                                                        Quantity                                          Quality 
                                                                                   
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  
Residents 
Regulatory 
Deficiencies 
Relationship 
    
NP -0.043** 
(0.022) 
-0.237** 
(0.115) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
    
LG -0.102*** 
(0.028) 
-0.021 
(0.152) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
    
Number of residents  0.450* 
(0.273) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
    
Regulatory deficiencies 0.016 
(0.010) 
 -0.004 
(0.004) 
    
Relationship -0.242* 
(0.136) 
-0.659 
(0.716) 
 
    
Inputs of RNs, LPNs and CNAs Yes Yes Yes 
    
Control variables 4 Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 369 369 369 
χ² 5369.16 39.14 56.68 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.29 0.01 
“R-sq” 0.94 0.09 0.13 
Notes: 
1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 221 NP and 49 LG. 
2. All variables except for organization type, chain status and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form.  
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and per 
capita income in the ZIP code area. 
Table 4b. Organization Type and Performance, Controlling for  
Tradeoff between Quantity and Quality 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
   
 
 Quantity Quality 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  Residents Regulatory deficiencies 
   
NP -0.049** 
(0.022) 
-0.252** 
(0.114) 
   
LG -0.109*** 
(0.028) 
-0.039 
(0.150) 
   
Number of residents  0.462* 
(0.273) 
   
Regulatory deficiencies 0.017* 
(0.010) 
 
   
Inputs of RNs, LPNs and CNAs Yes Yes 
   
Control variables 4 Yes Yes 
   
N 369 369 
χ² 5357.18 38.28 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.28 
“R-sq” 0.94 0.09 
 
Notes: 
1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 221 NP and 49 LG. 
2. All variables except for organization type, chain status and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. 
Estimations based on levels yield similar results. 
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and per 
capita income in the ZIP code area. 
Table 4c. Organization Type and Performance, Controlling for  
Tradeoff between Quantity and Quality 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
   
 
 Quantity Quality 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  Residents Relationship 
   
NP -0.048** 
(0.022) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
   
LG -0.103*** 
(0.028) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
   
Number of residents  -0.033* 
(0.020) 
   
Relationship -0.251* 
(0.136) 
 
   
Inputs of RNs, LPNs and CNAs Yes Yes 
   
Control variables 4 Yes Yes 
   
N 369 369 
χ² 5356.59 55.81 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.01 
“R-sq” 0.94 0.13 
 
Notes: 
1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 221 NP and 49 LG. 
2. All variables except for organization type, chain status and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. 
Estimations based on levels yield similar results. 
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and per 
capita income in the ZIP code area. 
Table 4d. Organization Type and Performance, Controlling for  
Tradeoff between Quantity and Quality 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
   
 
 Quality 
(relatively observable) 
Quality 
(relatively unobservable) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Regulatory deficiencies Relationship 
   
NP -0.256** 
(0.115) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
   
LG -0.062 
(0.149) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
   
Regulatory deficiencies  -0.007* 
(0.004) 
   
Relationship -0.981 
(0.715) 
 
   
Inputs of RNs, LPNs and CNAs Yes Yes 
   
Control variables 4 Yes Yes 
   
N 369 369 
χ² 37.93 43.42 
Prob> χ² 0.29 0.11 
“R-sq” 0.09 0.10 
 
Notes: 
1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 221 NP and 49 LG. 
2. All variables except for organization type, chain status and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. 
Estimations based on levels yield similar results. 
3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and per 
capita income in the ZIP code area. 
 
Appendix A. Organization Type and Performance – Chain vs. Independent Homes 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
 
 
   Quantity                                                                                                                         Quality 
 
                             Observable ?----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? Unobservable 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  
Residents 
Falls Infections 
 
Food  Safety Environment Regulatory 
Deficiencies 
Antipsychotics Satisfaction Relationship 
           
NP Independent -0.045 
(0.028) 
0.011 
(0.066) 
-0.048 
(0.080) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.275* 
(0.145) 
-0.243** 
(0.098) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
           
NP Chain -0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.102 
(0.064) 
-0.032 
(0.077) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.233* 
(0.141) 
-0.272*** 
(0.095) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
           
LG -0.104*** 
(0.032) 
0.020 
(0.076) 
-0.154* 
(0.092) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.075 
(0.165) 
-0.128 
(0.112) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
           
FP Chain -0.001 
(0.030) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
-0.124 
(0.086) 
-0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.244 
(0.155) 
-0.182* 
(0.106) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.011) 
           
Inputs of RNs, 
LPNs and CNAs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Control variables 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 
χ² 5021.93 16.79 21.99 28.36 17.52 8.98 13.24 23.03 36.58 15.79 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.21 0.01 0.00 0.07 
“R-sq” 0.93 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04 
 
Notes: 
  1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are NP independent, 122 NP chain, 35 FP independent, 64 FP chain, and 
  49 LG. For-profit independent homes are the omitted group. 
  2. All variables except for organization type, chain and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. Estimations 
  based on levels yield similar results. 
  3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. 
 4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and  
per capita income in the ZIP code area. 
Appendix B. Organization Type and Performance – Nonprofit Secular vs. Religious Homes 
SUR Estimations1,2,3 
    Quantity                                                                                                                         Quality 
 
                             Observable ?----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? Unobservable 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Number of  
Residents 
Falls Infections 
 
Food  Safety Environment Regulatory 
Deficiencies 
Antipsychotics Satisfaction Relationship 
           
NP Secular -0.057** 
(0.023) 
0.045 
(0.056) 
-0.043 
(0.067) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.230* 
(0.120) 
-0.124 
(0.082) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
           
NP Religious -0.041 
(0.026) 
0.050 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.074) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.342** 
(0.135) 
-0.170* 
(0.091) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.022** 
(0.010) 
           
LG -0.112*** 
(0.028) 
0.045 
(0.069) 
-0.132 
(0.082) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.080 
(0.148) 
-0.050 
(0.101) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
           
Inputs of RNs, 
LPNs and CNAs 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Control variables 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
N 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 369 
χ² 5418.57 31.37 42.44 52.78 29.80 27.96 34.34 43.18 63.05 40.31 
Prob> χ² 0.00 0.55 0.13 0.02 0.63 0.72 0.45 0.11 0.00 0.18 
“R-sq” 0.94 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.10 
 
Notes: 
  1. Among the 369 nursing homes included in the analysis, 99 are FP, 154 NP secular, 67 NP religious, and 49 LG. For-profit homes are 
  the omitted group. 
  2. All variables except for organization type, chain and status of hospital affiliation dummies are in natural logarithm form. Estimations 
  based on levels yield similar results. 
  3. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses. 
  4. For all estimations we control for chain, hospital affiliation, proportion of Medicare residents, degree of market competition, and  
per capita income in the ZIP code area. 
